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Abstract
We analyze the trade effects of a new unfolding transport infrastructure in con-
nection with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Using panel data for the years
1996-2018, featuring 27 exporting countries and 96 industries, we exploit variation in
the timing and number of railway connections to estimate whether European countries
benefit from increased export revenues and product variety of their shipments to China.
We find that both increase and that also indirectly connected countries benefit. Using
additional data on the mode of transport, we find that industries with intermediate
time-sensitivity appear to increase their utilization of rail-freight to China the most
and confirm that the overall increase in exports is driven by these industries.
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1 Introduction
Trade infrastructure is a key determinant for both market access and trade volumes between
countries. A well functioning infrastructure reduces frictions in the importing and exporting
process as well as overall trade processing times. Both have been shown to explain differences
in trade activity across countries (e.g. Djankov et al., 2010; Waugh, 2010).
In 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping announced the launch of the Belt and Road Ini-
tiative (BRI), a transcontinental infrastructure investment project aimed at reviving the
historical Eurasian Silk Roads. The BRI consists of two main elements: the Silk Road Eco-
nomic Belt, which focuses on the development of land-based connections between China and
Europe; and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which involves sea transport routes and
maritime infrastructure connecting China’s East Coast to South Asia, Europe, and Africa.
The former comprises the New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor, which consists of
several intercontinental railway connections between China and Europe.
In this paper, we study the trade response to the development of this ‘Corridor’. More
specifically, we analyze how the gradual expansion of the railway network connecting China
and Europe promotes exports of the latter. In doing so, we use different metrics to measure
the expansion of the network and consider a number of different outcome variables. Besides
the value of shipments, we look at trade creating effects of the Corridor for European ex-
porters by analyzing the extensive product margin over time. Moreover, we use data on the
transportation mode of European shipments to China in order to investigate in which sectors
exports appear to switch towards time-saving (compared to sea shipments) or cost-saving
(compared to air-freight) railway transport.
We exploit a detailed panel data set of countries’ merchandise exports to China, span-
ning more than two decades up until 2018. Since 2011, and more broadly since 2014, we
observe an increasing range of direct railway connections starting their operations on a reg-
ular schedule between China and Europe. Of the 23 European countries in our main sample
(i.e. the EU25, minus Cyprus and Malta), about two-thirds experience the establishment of
a direct connection, so that we can compare their export performance relative to (i) non di-
rectly connected European countries, as well as to (ii) other high-income but non-European
exporters, such as Japan and South Korea or Canada and the US.
To identify whether a country is connected to China by rail, we compile a list of announced
and initiated train connections, which specifies the main end or starting points in China and
Europe and the month when operations started. We also take into consideration the intra-
European rail network and consider countries that are indirectly connected through the
BRI, depending on their geographic proximity to a particular connection point in another
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European country. Along these lines, including non-European countries into our (i.e. East
Asian and North American) comparison group enables us to fully account for potential
spillover effects of the corridor on Europe’s rail-connectivity and trade with China.
Moreover, we analyze how the share of European shipments to China realized via rail
transport evolves as connections are being built. Our interest here focuses on the type of
goods that show the strongest response, so that we can better understand which products
or industries most likely benefit from these new connections. In terms of shipping times and
costs, rail transport lies in between ocean container shipment (which has larger capacity,
lower cost, and takes more time) and air-freight (which has lower capacity, higher cost and is
faster). We, hence, expect a non-linear relationship between products’ time-sensitivity and
their propensity to switch to rail freight.
Our findings suggest that BRI train connections increased exports from Europe to China
by about 10 percent on average, according to our baseline specification. While we find
a generally robust positive relationship across specification and estimators (i.e. log-linear
regression vs. PPML), we find statistically and quantitatively stronger evidence for exports
to China when using non-European control groups (e.g. North America, represented by
Canada and the US, and East Asia, represented by Japan and South Korea). This suggests
that not only directly connected countries in Europe benefit from the BRI. Moreover, the
performance differences are most pronounced relative to East Asian exporters, which could
suggest that the BRI diverted some of the trade between China and those countries (and
thus limiting the actual trade creation effects for China).
Besides the direct effects, we also find positive spillovers on exports by countries that are
neighbors or geographically proximate to locations where the China-European railways stop.
This is in line with our observations that the Corridor initially had only a few European end
points from and to which freight could be forwarded. As such transmissions complicate the
evaluation and quantification of the relationship between the BRI and European exports,
we turn to an alternative data set where we observe exports by transportation mode and
HS2 sector. This allows us, in a first step, to identify responsive industries and, in a second
step, include this new sector dimension into our analysis. Results obtained from this refined
identification strategy suggest an increase of exports by about 4-6 percent on average, and
a similar increase in the number of products exported to China.
Regarding the responsiveness of different industries, we find substantial heterogeneity.
On average, about one third of the HS2 industry sectors in our sample reveal significant
increases in rail-freight to China, compared to other transportation modes. Comparing
them to estimates of sector-level time sensitivity (as defined in Hummels and Schaur, 2013;
Ciani and Mau, 2020), we report suggestive evidence of a non-monotonous inverse u-shaped
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relationship in 5 out of 6 of our specifications. While the last specification suggests that the
relative likeliness of switching to rail-freight is orthogonal to time-sensitivity, the remaining
ones suggest that industries where timely delivery is of intermediate importance may benefit
the most from the BRI railway corridor.
Our paper makes several contributions to the empirical trade literature and in particular
the literature that focuses on the importance of trade infrastructure. Several studies struc-
turally estimate parameters of infrastructure-related trade costs to quantify its importance
(Bougheas et al., 1999; Limão and Venables, 2001; Egger and Larch, 2017). Hummels (2007)
reviews how advances in transport technologies since the 1950s contributed to increased trade
volumes and changing modes of transport, comparing ocean and air freight. Prominent ex-
amples with an explicit reference to railway networks are Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016)
and Donaldson (2018), who focus on quantifying the impact of improved market access on
the value of land and on price convergence respectively. Our approach is methodologically
different in that we abstain from structural estimation. While being consistent with the
gravity equation of international trade, we adopt a difference-and-difference type strategy
to evaluate the revealed quantitative changes in trade pattern after the initiation of BRI
railway operations.
Our study makes also a clear topical contribution by focusing on a recent and unprece-
dented, large scale infrastructure project. The BRI increasingly attracts interest of re-
searchers in economics, as it offers novel approaches to answering a wide range of research
questions (Li and Schmerer, 2017; Ruta et al., 2020).1 In this respect, our study is similar
to Jackson and Shepotylo (2018) and Baniya et al. (2019), who employ a structural gravity
model to estimate key parameters and quantify the potential effects of the BRI on trade with
China. However, like most of the BRI related research to date, their studies are forward-
looking in the sense that potential costs or benefits are discussed based on counterfactual
exercises. The only ex-post analysis we are aware of is Li et al. (2018), who focus primarily
on Chinese exports to Europe. We partly build on their modelling approach, but improve on
it by controlling more systematically for spurious correlation and potential omitted variable
bias, using fixed effects and control variables that are constistent with the gravity equation.
Moreover, extending the period of analysis by at least three years adds significant value
to our study, as many connections started their regular operations only in 2014 or after.
1Besides trade, prominent questions relate to implications for maritime transport (e.g. Lee et al.,
2018; Lau et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Chhetri et al., 2018), general logisitics and supply chains
(Liu et al., 2018; Yang et al., 2018; Shao et al., 2018), or economic growth and development impli-
cations of the BRI (e.g. Enderwick, 2018; Cai, 2017). Questions naturally also go beyond economics
and discuss also the important geopolitical role of the BRI, as The Economist highlights in a re-
cent Special Report from February 2020: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/06/
china-wants-to-put-itself-back-at-the-centre-of-the-world.
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Accordingly, our results differ from their findings which seemed to question any detectable
impact of the BRI on Europe’s exports to China.
Our paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present some background informa-
tion about the BRI in general, and the new rail connections between China and Europe
in particular. We also outline some theoretical channels through which we think the BRI
might promote exports from Europe to China. In section 3 we describe the data used in our
analysis and explain our empirical methodology, as well as our measurement and identifi-
cation strategies. Section 4 presents our empirical results, including robustness checks and
alternative specifications. Section 5 discusses the implications of our research and concludes.
2 The ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiative
2.1 General background and scope
Announced in 2013, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative (or Belt and Road Initiative; BRI)
has been promoted as a project aimed at increasing connectivity between the European,
Asian and African continents, and to strengthen their partnerships. Formally, there are five
interdependent objectives:2 (i) enhance policy coordination; (ii) improve infrastructure con-
nectivity; (iii) reinforce trade and investment cooperation; (iv) promote financial integration;
and (5) support people-to-people collaboration.
According to McKinsey (2016) the BRI covers almost two-thirds of the world’s popula-
tion, one-third of global GDP and at least a quarter of world trade. However, there exists
no formal list of participants so that the BRI can be considered as an open agreement where
everyone is welcome to participate (World Bank, 2017). Also the involvement can be mea-
sured differently. In Table A1, we present one specific view on the scope of the BRI, which
uses data from the China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT).3 It displays monthly BRI-
related foreign investment and construction contracts for Chinese firms across the world, up
until December 2019. China’s BRI activities reached out to 112 different countries on all
continents. It is especially active in Africa and Asia, where almost all its investment and
construction projects relate to the BRI. There is also a sizeable number of projects in Europe
and the Americas, as well as a few transactions in South Korea and New Zealand. Japan,
Australia, Canada and the US did not receive any BRI-related investment from China.
In the context of our study, we focus primarily on what can be called the “geographic
approach” to BRI participation (World Bank, 2017). That is, we ask whether a transport
2See https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/belt-and-road/.
3The published by the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The data can be
accessed here: https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
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Figure 1: Six economic corridors constitute the Belt
Source: International Road Transport Union (IRU.org, accessed: July 2020).
corridor runs through a particular country or not. As we can observe in Figure 1, there
are six economic land corridors and a number of maritime corridors. While the land routes
establish connections among countries in Asia and Europe, the maritime corridors comple-
ment those connections and involve additional countries mainly in the Middle East, North
Africa, and the eastern coast of Sub-Saharan Africa. The New Eurasia Land Bridge Eco-
nomic Corridor (henceforth: ‘the Corridor’) denotes one of two northern land routes and
is the only one that establishes direct rail-freight connections between Western Europe and
China. Detailed information about the European end points of the various train connection
that started operating via the Corridor will constitute the basis for our measure of bilateral
trade-infrastructure improvements.
2.2 The ‘Corridor’: Connecting China and Europe
The Corridor consists of a number of direct railway connections between Chinese and Euro-
pean cities. By the end of 2019, there were 15 of such connections, which we can include into
our analysis. They operate at varying frequency and can be distinguished by the Chinese
city to which the connection was initially established.4 Within Europe, there may be several
destinations and their number increases as existing connections expand and new connections
4Many of these connections have several stops in China as well, so that here are numerous potential
end points for European exports. Since we are unable to observe those or make any meaningful distinction
between them, we are constrained to focusing on the number of distinct train routes.
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are launched. Almost all of the railway connections enter the European Union at the border
of Belarus with Poland and carry forward through Germany.
Table A2 gives a detailed overview of the direct railway connections for which we collected
information from various sources. The average reported distance travelled by a train amounts
to slightly more than 10,000km and ranges between about 8,000 and 13,000km overall.
Reported travel times for a rail connection vary between 11 and 26 days and average at 15
days. The much more eclectic information about the alternative maritime shipping times
suggests about 40 days on average, more than 2.5 times as many days, which highlights the
time advantage of rail transport over conventional sea shipment.5
Figure 2: Evolution of the BRI Corridor, number of connections to China since 2011
Note: Authors’ calculations based on data from various source (see Table A2). Chart depicts number of
direct train connections with China across European countries at monthly frequency. Belgium (BE) includes
also Luxembourg.
In Figure 2 we show how the number of direct railway connections to China evolved over
time and across Europe; variation we will exploit in our empirical analysis. It shows that
direct connections via the Corridor differ substantially. Some countries are involved in almost
all connections (and numbers increase over time), while others participate only recently or in
a few lines. We also note that several (mostly geographically peripheral) European economies
have not been at all directly connected to China via the Corridor.6 This does not necessarily
5Note that comparison of these numbers is complicated by that fact that shipping times within China
(e.g. from the factory to the port and from port to final destination) are typically not quoted. Using data
on bilateral sea distances from CERDI (Bertoli et al., 2016), maritime shipping between China and Europe
bridges 14,200 to 22,400km, with an average of 18,800km.
6Considering the EU-25, the not directly connected countries are: Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Greece,
Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden.
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mean that these countries are unable to take advantage of the Corridor. Europe itself has
a tightly-knit infrastructure network and many of the destinations are located at major
transport and logistics hubs. We will take into consideration indirectly connected countries
as well.
2.3 Theoretical channels
Direct theoretical channels through which BRI railway connections may affect international
trade are threefold, but they all operate through the bilateral component φni of a standard
gravity equation, which can be derived from conventional trade models (Head and Mayer,
2014):
Xni = MnSiφni, (1)
where the left-hand side variable Xni denotes the value of exports from country i to desti-
nation n, Mn denotes a general demand shifter and Si denotes a general supply shifter. The
bilateral term φni captures a wide set of exporter-importer specific trade determinants, such
as geographic indicators (e.g. distance), cultural and historical indicators (e.g. language or
colonial history), and bilateral contemporaneous political indicators (e.g. trade agreements).
We expect the BRI effects to operate through the distance-related channel. First, al-
though the BRI does not change the geographic location of countries, it affects effectively
travelled distances. We noticed earlier that they are reduced by about 50 percent compared
to conventional ocean shipping routes between Europe and China. According to Chaney
(2018), lower distances increase trade independently of trade policies and transport technol-
ogy, as they affect the network structure of internationally operating firms. Second, lower
travel distances and faster transportation technology reduce the time it takes for a good to
be shipped to a specific destination. Hummels and Schaur (2013) show that shorter delivery
times have real trade effects as they enter the objective function of importers. Empirical
evidence by Djankov et al. (2010) and Ciani and Mau (2020) supports this mechanism and
also that travel times are of variable importance across industries. Finally, shipping routes,
duration and transportation mode determine the charges that have to be paid. While per
unit charges should be lower for shorter travels (Hummels and Skiba, 2004), they are likely
to be higher in the case of capacity constraints for a specific mode of transport. Compared
to ocean shipping, we expect charges and transportation costs to be higher for trade via the
BRI, but still considerably lower than air-freight.7
Altogether, the three different channels (distance, time, and transport charges) are likely
7Anecdotal evidence from Li et al. (2018) suggests 80 percent lower shipping charges for rail transport
compared to air-freight.
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to adjust in a way that trade barriers between China and the EU are reduced. To what
extent this stimulates trade is an empirical question, but we expect to observe adjustments
in both overall export revenues and at the extensive margin (i.e. the number of different
types of goods exported). The latter will be the case if the new trade routes lower trade
barriers for certain transport- and time-sensitive products in such a way that they start being
exported to China. In fact, adjustments may differ across industries if they are differentially
sensitive to timely delivery. As air-freight remains a faster but more expensive modal choice,
trade in goods with intermediate levels of time-sensitivity might be most responsive to the
new BRI railway connections.
3 Empirical model and data
3.1 Data and sample selection
To analyze the effect of newly established BRI connections on Europe’s exports to China,
we use comprehensive information from the CEPII BACI database (Gaulier and Zignago,
2010). It reports annual bilateral trade flows between more than 200 countries at the 6-
digit Harmonized System level (HS6), which distinguishes about 5,000 different product
categories. Using the most recently released version, we observe trade for the period 1996-
2018. By counting the number of HS6 products a country exports to China in a given year,
we attempt to capture the extensive product margin. In doing so, we assume that unreported
trade flows in the data reflect negligible amounts of trade or true export zeros.
For the main part of our analysis, we aggregate the data to the 2-digit HS level (HS2)
and obtain two outcome variables.8 First, the revenues (measured in thousands of current
US dollars) earned by country i from exporting goods of HS2 chapter k to China in year t,
Xikt. Second, the number of HS6 goods within HS2 chapter k, shipped by country i to China
in year t, Nikt. According to our discussion above, both variables should reveal a positive
relationship with BRI railway connections.
Our baseline estimation sample considers exports by 23 EU member states (i.e. the
EU25, minus Cyprus and Malta) and 4 non-European high-income countries (i.e. Canada,
Japan, South Korea, and the US). The latter are included as an additional control group,
which we believe is economically comparable to EU25 exporters but not connected to China
via the BRI. This enables us to investigate potential spillover effects of the BRI connections
within Europe. To detect those, we will report our main results for alternative compositions
8HS2 chapters range from 1 to 97 in our data. Chapter 77 is currently not used by the World Customs
Organization (WCO), so that there are 96 sectors overall.
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of sub-samples of exporters.
3.2 Empirical model
3.2.1 Baseline estimation equation
Export revenue equation. We adopt the following empirical model (expressed in logs)
to estimate the effect of BRI connections on exports to China:
lnXikt = βtrainit + γ
′Zikt + µkt + µik + εikt, (2)
where the dependent variable measures the (log) dollar value of export revenues from ship-
ments to China and trainit indicates whether exporter i was connected to China via the BRI
at time t. We include two types of multi-dimensional fixed effects to establish consistency
with the gravity equation: µkt captures China’s demand shifter and varies across industries
and over time, independently of which country is exporting.9 µik captures time-invariant
bilateral and industry-specific trade barriers between exporter i and China. Since exporter-
year fixed effects would be perfectly collinear with our main variable of interest, trainit, we
proxy the supply shifter with control variables Zikt. In our revenue equation, we will use i’s
global exports in HS2 sector k and year t, which is defined as XWikt ≡
∑
nXnikt.
Export diversification equation. Whenever we estimate the number of goods exported
to China, we include two additional control variables. First, we include the equivalent to
global export revenues by counting how many different HS6 products exporter i ships to any
destination at time t, within HS2 chapter k (Nikt). Second, to account for the fact that our
count variable has an upper bound, we interact our main variable of interest with i’s degree
of diversification in k at the beginning of our sample period (trainit × [N96ik /Nmaxk ]). The
ratio [N96ik /N
max
k ] is bound between zero and one and denotes the fraction of HS6 products
within an HS2 chapter, i exported to China at t0 = 1996. We expect that initially high
levels of diversification result in systematically lower rates of diversification after getting
connected via the BRI, simply because no further diversification can be observed with our
count measure.
Estimation methods. Even with fairly aggregated data and a sample of frequently trad-
ing countries, export zeros result in missing (or even omitted) information when estimating
a log-linear model like Equation (2). Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) formulate a more
9Since China is the only destination we observe, importer subscripts n are omitted here.
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general critique on the use of log-linear estimation and suggest a Poisson-Pseudo-Maximum-
Likelihood (PPML) estimator, which has since become widely applied in the empirical trade
literature. The corresponding model to estimate export revenues takes the following form:
Xikt = exp{βtrainit + γ′Zikt + µkt + µik} × νikt, (3)
and represents simply the multiplicative version of the log-linear specification above. By
avoiding any variable transformation that complicates the presence of zeros, the PPML
estimator is able to exploit the full information of the data, including absence of trade (i.e.
zeros). For our baseline findings we will report results obtained from both log-linear least
squares and PPML estimation.
3.2.2 Measurement
Our trade data and estimation methods are widely used in the empirical trade literature.
However, our measurement and identification strategies are novel, given that we are the first
to estimate the effect of BRI connections on exports in a non-structural way. Hence, we have
to be aware of the caveats associated with measurement and with potentially confounding
effects or endogeneity. This is important, because our data does not allow us to observe the
true amount of trade that is realized via a BRI rail connection. What we do observe is (i)
whether and since when a particular country is connected to China via the BRI, (ii) where
the connection starts or ends in China and (iii) how much a country exported to China
before and after it became connected.
With this information at hand, we construct three different measures for our main variable
of interest, trainit. First, we define it as a simple binary indicator variable, which takes a
value equal to one as soon as a direct connection has been launched (see Table A2).10
Although this measure is fairly crude, it allows us to infer whether the pure existence of
a direct rail connection reveals differential export performance compared to non-connected
countries. Our second measure takes into account the number of different connections to
China. As outlined in section 2, rail-freight routes differ by their final destinations in China
and we argue that this might be relevant, given its geographic size and internal distances.
By counting the number of railway connections between exporter i and China, we no longer
estimate the overall effect of a BRI connection, but rather the marginal effect of adding one
additional connection. In a similar fashion, our third measure, which takes into account the
time that has elapsed since the first connection has been launched, will inform us about the
10A value in between 0 and 1 is assigned in the year when the connection started to operate, whenever it
started later than January. In that case, trainit = (13−month)/12.
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effect of being connected via the BRI for one additional year.
3.2.3 Identification
Despite using alternative measures and substantial variation in our data (see Figure 2), we
cannot rule out that our results will be biased due to unobserved contemporaneous factors.
While we do not believe that reverse causality plays a major role here,11 we are aware that also
indirect connections might play a role and promote exports for countries that are neighbors
of or proximately located to a directly connected country. Such indirect connections could
result in a downward bias in our estimates, even though having non-European exporters in
our control group might address part of this issue. In our robustness checks, we experiment
with alternative definitions of being connected.
Another potential caveat of identification is that we cannot observe the mode of trans-
port. As long as this is not the case, we are unable to verify whether any change in export
performance actually takes place via the BRI railway connections. To address this concern,
we will report results from an alternative data set of (only) European exporters, which fea-
tures information on the transport mode. We will exploit this information also to determine
sectors that increasingly rely on rail transport when exporting to China, after getting con-
nected, and to revisit our baseline findings by adding this sectoral dimension to estimate the
BRI effect on EU exports.
A final threat to identification is that we do not observe the frequency and capacity of
shipments via a particular train connection. It is possible, for instance, that a country gets
connected at some point (resulting in trainit = 1), but operations are discontinued due to
low profitability. In that case, we would have to set trainit back to zero. Unfortunately,
such detailed information is not available and prevents us from distinguishing these and
other qualitative dimensions across train different connections and over time, which might
result in an attenuation bias and lack of precision of our coefficient estimates. While we have
no possibility to address this issue of measurement error directly, we will keep in mind that
our reported findings reflect average estimated effects and that responses in trade activity
for specific individual connections might differ substantially.
11Reverse causality would imply that a train connection is established due to increased trade. While
this might be true for the decision to build any connection between China and Europe, the exact location
within Europe is likely to be determined by logistical factors in a fashion that major transport hubs and
geography are preferred over more remote locations. Along these lines, the way a handful of European sea
ports dominate the EU’s maritime trade with the rest of the world, a few logistic hubs appear to dominate
EU’s railway connections to and from China.
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4 Empirical findings
4.1 Baseline results for export revenues and diversification
Export revenues. Table 1 reports our baseline results for the value of exports to China,
showing point estimates obtained from 24 different specifications. Specifications differ in
terms of their estimation method (i.e. log-linear least squares versus PPML), country samples
and subsamples, and in terms of the variable that measures BRI connections (see Panels A
through C). In most of these specifications, we observe a positive and statistically significant
relationship between countries’ exports and a railway connection to China via the Corridor.
Table 1: Export revenues and direct railway connection to China, baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Est. method: Least Squares (log-lin.) PPML
Sample Full Treat+EU Treat+NA Treat+EA Full Treat+EU Treat+NA Treat+EA
Panel A: Binary indicator of connection
trainit (binary) 0.169
∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.083∗ 0.178∗∗ 0.091∗∗ -0.007 0.046∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.034) (0.037) (0.034) (0.045) (0.026) (0.023) (0.019) (0.028)
Panel B: Number of connections
trainit (count) 0.033
∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Panel C: Years since first connection
trainit (years) 0.048
∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.016∗∗ 0.009 0.011∗ 0.024∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 46,403 37,670 30,014 30,031 55,751 46,951 34,487 34,487
Clusters (it) 598 506 368 368 598 506 368 368
Note: Table shows coefficient estimates of the impact of direct BRI railway connections on the value of
exports from Europe and China. Samples distinguish countries included, where Treat+EU corresponds to
the EU23 (i.e. EU25 minus Cyprus and Malta); Treat + NA corresponds to the 14 connected European
countries as well as Canada and the US; and Treat + EA corresponds to the 14 connected European countries
as well as Japan and South Korea. Results in columns (1) and (5) use the full sample, which includes the
EU23 plus NA plus EA. All specifications include HS2 sector-year and HS2 sector-exporter fixed effects, and
a control variable for total sectoral exports, Xikt. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at
exporter-year level. Statistical significance: a = p<0.01, ** = p<0.05, * = p<0.1.
Looking at the full sample in Panel A, columns (1) and (5) report between 9 and 17
percent higher export revenues in China upon the initiation of a direct railway connection
(relative to the non-connected countries in Europe, North America and East Asia). Panel B
suggests that each additional direct connection from country i to China is associated with a
1-3 percent relative increase in exports. In Panel C we find that, on average, each additional
year of direct rail freight operations are associated with 1.5-5 percent higher export revenues
relative to non-connected economies. Comparing our log-linear specifications to the PPML
estimates, we notice that the latter produces more conservative estimates throughout.
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In several specifications the estimated differences reveal most strongly in samples where
the control group is composed of Japan and South Korea, as indicated in columns (4) and
(8). In contrast to this, relative exports among the European countries indicate only a
minor advantage of having a direct connection, as shown in columns (2) and (6). This might
suggest that the EU as a whole benefits from the BRI through increased exports to China.
Moreover, the fact that the revealed relative export performance appears to depends partly
on the control group might suggest that improved market access for Europe either displaced
some of the East Asian countries’ exports to China, or that certain underlying trends have
not appropriately been controlled for. These factors make identification more difficult and
we will attempt to address them in the following subsection below.
Market access and diversification. Table 2 reports our findings for extensive margin
effects, which we measure by counting the number of distinct HS6 products each country ex-
ports to China within their HS2-sector level exports. Moreover, as explained in the previous
section, we account for the fact that our diversification variable has an upper bound, Nmaxk .
Hence, we include an interaction of our main variable of interest with exporter i’s initial
stage of diversification in sector k. As expected, the interaction term produces a negative
and statistically significant coefficient.12
Regarding the estimated relationship between the BRI connections and export diversifi-
cation, we find a positive and highly significant relationship. Overall, connected countries
experienced a relative increase in their product range by almost 30 percent. Each additional
connection and the longer these connections are operating, the larger is this advantage. As
in our previous results for export revenues, we observe that most of this increase appears
to materialize vis-à-vis the two East Asian exporters in our sample. However (and partly
in contrast to the previous results), they do not fully drive the overall findings reported in
columns (1) and (5). Improved market access opportunities appear to result also relative to
the US and (to a smaller extent) also relative to not directly connected European countries.
4.2 Indirect connections and robustness
Alternative measures and controls. Since our baseline specifications considered only
the relationship between exports and direct BRI railway connections to China, we did not
allow neighbors or very nearby countries to benefit. Such an approach might be too restric-
12The ratio displayed in the table is equal to 1, whenever exporter i already exported all the HS6 products
that fall into a respective HS2 sector at the beginning of our sample period (in 1996). It is zero if it did
not export any HS6 product from that sector initially. The former case rules out any further diversification
whereas the latter case makes it very likely to occur.
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Table 2: Export diversification and direct railway connections to China, baseline results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Est. method: Least Squares (log-lin.) PPML
Sample Full Treat+EU Treat+NA Treat+EA Full Treat+EU Treat+NA Treat+EA
Panel A: Binary indicator of connection
trainit (binary) 0.191
∗∗ 0.119∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.253∗∗ 0.302∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.324∗∗ 0.367∗∗
(0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.032) (0.038) (0.035) (0.040) (0.041)
× init. div. -0.585∗∗ -0.615∗∗ -0.557∗∗ -0.553∗∗ -0.507∗∗ -0.486∗∗ -0.536∗∗ -0.567∗∗
(n96ik/n
max
k ) (0.048) (0.053) (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054)
Panel B: Number of connections
trainit (count) 0.035
∗∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.038∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.055∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
× init. div. -0.094∗∗ -0.097∗∗ -0.088∗∗ -0.087∗∗ -0.072∗∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.075∗∗ -0.079∗∗
(n96ik/n
max
k ) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Panel C: Years since first connection
trainit (years) 0.051
∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.044∗∗ 0.072∗∗ 0.080∗∗
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015)
× init. div. -0.142∗∗ -0.145∗∗ -0.132∗∗ -0.131∗∗ -0.105∗∗ -0.098∗∗ -0.110∗∗ -0.117∗∗
(n96ik/n
max
k ) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Observations 46,403 37,670 30,014 30,031 55,751 46,951 34,487 34,487
Clusters (it) 598 506 368 368 598 506 368 368
Note: Table shows coefficient estimates of the impact of direct BRI railway connections on the number of
HS6 products exported within an HS2 sector. Samples distinguish countries included, where Treat+EU
corresponds to the EU23 (i.e. EU25 minus Cyprus and Malta); Treat + NA corresponds to the 14 connected
European countries as well as Canada and the US; and Treat + EA corresponds to the 14 connected European
countries as well as Japan and South Korea. Results in columns (1) and (5) use the full sample, which includes
the EU23 plus NA plus EA. All specifications include HS2 sector-year and HS2 sector-exporter fixed effects,
and a control variable for total sectoral exports, Xikt, as well as total number of goods exported. Standard
errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at exporter-year level. Statistical significance: a = p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
tive, given that the majority BRI connections via the Corridor concentrates in two countries.
This could explain the relatively smaller coefficient estimates obtained for the purely Eu-
ropean samples. However, we also noticed that there are potentially unobserved regional
effects that drive our results (and inflate coefficient estimates for the non-European control
groups). Although we control for countries’ general export performance, there might be
region-specific shocks that are correlated with exports to China and the gradual increase
in the number of railway connections with Europe. To address the latter point we include
a full set of region-year fixed effects into our model, where regions are the EU (i.e. the
23 European countries), East Asia (i.e. Japan and South Korea), and North America (i.e.
Canada and the US).
In order to take into consideration also indirect access to the railway network we consider
two modifications of our treatment group. First, we count countries as being connected to
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the BRI if they are either directly connected themselves or if a direct neighboring country
gets connected. In our alternative modification, we use a wider criterion and include also
countries that are less than 500 km away from a country that is directly connected. These
modifications have a major impact on our treatment variable. For example, after the exten-
sion to direct neighbors, we count 11 instead of 2 countries (out of 23) with a connection
since 2011.13 While the maximum number of connections a country obtained was 10 with
our standard measure, taking into account indirect connections via neighbors or proximate
countries enables some countries to access all 15 connections we consider in this paper.
Table 3: Export revenues due to direct or indirect railway connections to China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Measure BRI:
direct only
(baseline)
direct + indirect
(incl. neighbors)
direct + indirect
(incl. proximate)
Panel A: Export revenues
trainit (binary) 0.091
∗∗ -0.063∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.021 0.172∗∗ 0.109∗∗
(0.026) (0.028) (0.024) (0.036) (0.024) (0.028)
trainit (count) 0.010
∗∗ -0.011∗∗ 0.010∗∗ -0.014∗∗ 0.014∗∗ -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
trainit (years) 0.016
∗∗ -0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ -0.026∗∗ 0.027∗∗ -0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Panel B: Exported HS6 products
trainit (binary) 0.302
∗∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.405∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.403∗∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
trainit (count) 0.049
∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.034∗∗ 0.047∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
trainit (years) 0.071
∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Region-year FEs: No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 55,751 55,751 55,751 55,751 55,751 55,751
Clusters (it) 598 598 598 598 598 598
Note: Table shows PPML coefficient estimates of the impact of direct and indirect BRI railway connections on
export revenues and the number of HS6 products exported within an HS2 sector. Each cell reports coefficient
of a separate estimation. Samples include the full set of countries (i.e. the EU23 plus NA plus EA). All
specifications include HS2 sector-year and HS2 sector-exporter fixed effects, and a control variable for total
sectoral exports, Xikt. Panel B also controls for total number of goods exported and differential effects of
connection depending on countries’ initial product coverage. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for
clustering at exporter-year level. Statistical significance: a = p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results for export revenues. In Table 3, we report our PPML results for export rev-
enues (in Panel A) and for export diversification (in Panel B). Looking first at Panel A,
13The extension to proximate countries adds one additional country to early treatment (i.e. the United
Kingdom, which is 495 km away from Germany, according to the CEPII bilateral distances data set we used
to construct our measure).
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we make two observations. Whenever we keep our original specification without region-year
fixed effects, increasing the scope of our treatment group also increases the magnitude of the
estimated coefficient for our BRI connections. This can be seen by comparing columns (1),
(3), and (5) of Panel A and suggests that countries might export more to China, even if they
are only indirectly connected via the Corridor.
However, we also observe that including region-year fixed effects results in substantial
downward corrections of the coefficients. This implies that the observed increases of exports
to China by newly connected countries are highly correlated with EU-wide changes in ex-
ports. Moreover, columns (2), (4) and (6) suggest that directly connected countries may
have benefited less than indirectly connected countries from the new export opportunities
via the Corridor. Taking into account also the indirectly connected countries, in column (6),
we find that the existence of a connection to China via the Corridor is associated with about
11 percent higher exports to China. The number of connections as well as the number of
years since a connection existed for the first time, does not appear to make any significant
difference anymore.
Results for export diversification. Turning to Panel B of Table 3, we find a robust
significantly positive relationship between railway connections and the range of products
exported. Although region-year fixed effect induce downward corrections also here, we still
find a relative increase in the number of products shipped by 20 percent on average. Every
additional connection increases this range by about 3 percent and each additional year of
operation corresponds to an about 5 percent increase in the product range.
Altogether, the results from this subsection support our hypothesis that the BRI has
provided improved market access and new export opportunities for European countries.
Countries with direct or indirect BRI connections appear to have about 10 percent higher
export revenues from selling their goods to China. The fact that we cannot detect a robust
relationship between export revenues and additional connections (or the time elapsed since
their first setup) might be due to different factors we cannot observe in our data, such
as differential frequency and capacity of utilization, potential time-lags, or network effects
that prevent a clearer separation of connected an non-connected countries (or regions). We
therefore attempt to augment our identification in the following subsection.
4.3 Transport mode and differential responses across sectors
Our main data set does not provide any information about the mode of transport chosen
by exporters, which prevents us from verifying that the estimated changes in exports can
actually be attributed to rail freight. Data from Eurostat, however, does provide such
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information for the years 2000-2019 for our set of European exporters. In this subsection, we
leverage this information in order to further evaluate the contribution of the BRI to Europe’s
export performance.
4.3.1 Rising importance of rail-freight?
Data and measurement. Before presenting results, we have to discuss some features of
the data. We work with a balanced panel of reported exports by each of our 23 European
countries to China. The data is disaggregated at the HS2 sector level and distinguishes
9 modes of transport. Table 4 depicts these modes along with their number of non-zero
observations, the number of HS2 sectors where they are used, and the percentage of the
total shipping value they account for.
Table 4: Transport modes of European exports to China, 2000-2019
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Transport mode Sea Air Road Rail Post
Inland
Waterw.
Self
Prop.
Fixed
Mech.
Unknown
# Non-zero Obs. 27,876 29,395 20,383 5,605 4,825 931 290 94 2,764
# HS2 Sectors 97 95 96 70 9 18 2 0 77
% of Exports 60.5 30.1 2.9 1.5 0.1 0.1 4.0 0.0 0.9
Note: Authors’ calculations based on extraction from Eurostat data series (DS-043327) for 23 European
countries and period 2000-2019. The total number of observations is 42,680 and the total number of non-
zero observations in this data set is 33,696. HS2 sectors were counted if transport mode accounted for at
least 0.1 percent of the total value of sectoral shipments during the sample period.
Not surprisingly, sea transport accounts for the largest portion of shipments. It amounts
to more than 60 percent of the total exported value and is used in all 97 HS2 sectors.14
Air transport accounts for 30 percent of the value of shipments, while only 1.5 percent of
exports used rail freight. This minor number could be explained by the recency of the
BRI connections, as the data already starts in 2000. However, another transport mode
is surprisingly prominent. According to our calculations, about three percent of exports
to China use road transport in a wide range of observations and sectors.15 Given this
fairly unrealistic statistic, we consider the possibility that transport modes are not always
accurately reported. The high number of observations with road transport might result from
indirect shipments via export hubs in another country. Likewise, rail shipments might signify
both, direct shipments to China or shipments to a seaport or other logistics hub.
14While HS chapter number 77 is not currently defined by the World Customs Organization (WCO), which
administers the HS nomenclature, Eurostat reports trade in a residual chapter 99 for goods not else where
classified.
15Another mode of transport worth explaining is “Self Propulsion”, shown in column (7). Such trade takes
place essentially only in two sectors, which are “air planes” (HS chapter 88) and “ships” (HS chapter 89).
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Following this reasoning we consider changes in the transport mode structure for countries
with a direct rail connection to China via the Corridor. To assess this, we use the varying
indicators for a direct connection, namely: (i) a simple dummy for a connection; (ii) the
number of different connections; and (iii) the years since the first direct connection was set
up. As dependent variables, we use different measures for the prominence of rail transport.
First, similar to Hummels and Schaur (2013) we use the log-ratios of exports via rail to
non-rail transport modes. Since such a specification has the advantage that values have no
upper or lower bound, a drawback in the context of our data is a relatively small number of
observations, due to frequent zeros. Hence, we also estimate the fraction of rail exports in
total shipments using PPML.
Table 5: Railways as transport mode for European exports to China
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method Least Squares (OLS) PPML
Dep. var. ln
Xrailikt
Xseaikt
ln
Xrailikt
Xairikt
ln
Xrailikt
Xair+seaikt
ln
Xrailikt
Xnon-railikt
ln
Xrailikt
Xikt
Xrailikt
Xikt
Panel A: Binary indicator (connected = 1)
trainit (binary) 0.287 0.154 0.155 0.157 0.159 -0.722
∗∗
(0.271) (0.288) (0.297) (0.278) (0.271) (0.243)
Panel B: Count indicator (# of direct connections)
trainit (count) 0.299
∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.268∗∗ 0.278∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.184∗∗
(0.065) (0.065) (0.072) (0.066) (0.065) (0.071)
Panel C: Duration indicator (years since first direct connection)
trainit (years) 0.500
∗∗ 0.524∗∗ 0.480∗∗ 0.469∗∗ 0.477∗∗ 0.561∗∗
(0.104) (0.102) (0.107) (0.103) (0.101) (0.084)
Observations 4,316 4,795 4,878 4,939 4,972 16,473
Clusters (it) 316 329 333 333 333 424
Note: Table shows log-linear regression and PPML coefficient estimates for prevalence of rail transport among
European exports to China, conditional on direct rail connection via BRI. Each cell reports coefficient of
a separate estimation. Sample represents 23 EU countries, 97 HS2 sectors, and 20 years (2000-2019). All
specifications include HS2 sector-year and HS2 sector-exporter fixed effects, as well as exporter-specific linear
trends. Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at exporter-year level. Statistical significance:
a = p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Results. We show our results in Table 5, where all specifications include HS2 sector-year
and HS2 sector-exporter fixed effects (as in previous specifications), as well as exporter-
specific linear trends. Using the simple binary indicator for a direct connection does not
produce any clear results (Panel A). The log-linear specifications report positive, yet sta-
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tistically insignificant coefficients, regardless of how railway prominence is measured. Our
PPML specification in column (6) reports even a negative and significant coefficient, which
suggests that rail exports became less prominent. This is an implausible result and suggests
that simply observing the pure existence of a rail connection is not sufficient to determine
the use of rail transportation to China.
We obtain more consistent findings as we use finer measures for direct connections. In
Panel B, we observe that each additional direct rail connection to China increases rail-freight
relative to sea or air freight by about thirty percent. Similar magnitudes are reported for
rail-freight relative to other non-rail (or overall) exports. The PPML estimator makes a
downward correction of these coefficients to about 18 percent. Similarly, in Panel C, we
observe that each additional year since the first launch of a direct rail connection to China
is associated with higher utilization of this transport mode.
Overall, we find that direct BRI connections appear to be associated with the mode of
transport European exporters choose. Not surprisingly, the age and number of these train
connections matter for this decision, as we do not distinguish their quality, capacity and
frequency of operations.
4.3.2 Heterogeneous responses across industries
Besides the general relationship assessed in the previous subsection, it is also of interest
to understand which industries in particular switch to increased rail-freight. Given that
products can be expected to differ in their propensity to use a particular transport mode,
we can use such variation also to revisit our general results on the value and diversification
of exports to China.
We therefore estimate once again our specifications from above, but this time separately
for each HS2 sector. The log-linear model from Table 5 column (5) now takes the following
form:
(log) Rail share := ln
XR,kit
Xkit
= βktrainyrsit +
∑
i
δki (Di × yeart) + εkit, (4)
where trainyrsit measures the number of years elapsed since setup of the first direct connec-
tion and
∑
i δ
k
i (Di × yeart) denotes exporter-specific linear trends to proxy general gradual
preference shifts over time. Our interest focuses on the estimated β̂k, which indicates the
relative probability of HS2 sector-k to shift towards rail freight, as direct connections to
China via the Corridor are being launched.
To analyze our estimation results, we note that our specification is very similar to the
one used by Hummels and Schaur (2013), who estimate sector-specific time-sensitivity pa-
rameters in a transport-mode choice model for air-freight versus container shipments. We
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can compare our results to see how the differential response across sectors in switching to
increased rail-freight relates to their estimates of products’ time-sensitivity.16 We expect
that rail-transport is most likely to be adopted at intermediate levels of time-sensitivity, as
it is faster than sea transport but still considerably slower than air-freight.
Our results are plotted in Figure 3 (a)-(f), where we removed extreme values of time-
sensitivity and β̂k.17 Despite large confidence intervals, we find patterns that resemble a
non-linear inversely u-shaped relationship with time sensitivity in most of our specifications.
Only our PPML model seems to reject a clear non-monotonic relationship, and instead
suggests that time sensitivity is orthogonal to the relative sectoral propensity of shifting
towards rail-transport. Such lack of a clear relationship could point at additional factors
being at play for the transport-mode choice of exporters. However, given the limited number
of observations in this figure (as well as the underlying data samples), the presented patterns
can be seen to be only of indicative nature.
4.3.3 Revisiting the BRI effect on European exports
In this final subsection, we use our estimates of βk to provide further evidence on the rela-
tionship between the BRI railways and European exports to China. With six different sets
of βk estimates (each based on a different specification, as presented above), we expect that
exports increase more in sectors where βk > 0 and significant. Hence, using a significance
threshold of 10 percent, we create an HS2-specific and time-invariant variable, which is equal
to the estimated β̂k, if the above requirement holds, while it takes a value of 0 in all other
cases. When carrying out our estimation, we benefit from an additional sectoral dimension
in our BRI measure, which allows us to control for exporter-specific aggregate supply shocks
using a full set of exporter-year fixed effects. This is an improvement compared to our pre-
vious approach, where the lack of cross-sectoral variation allowed identification exclusively
across countries and over time. Hence, Table 6 reports results only for the differential cor-
relation between BRI connections and exports that is conditional on the responsiveness of
HS2 sectors in their transport mode.
Panel A of Table 6 shows that we continue to obtain a positive and statistically signifi-
cant relationship between export revenues and the existence of railway connections to China.
16Time-sensitivity in their paper is defined as the ad-valorem tariff equivalent of importers’ willingness
to pay for a one day earlier delivery of a product. Hence, a higher willingness to pay indicates higher
time-sensitivity.
17We define outliers as observations with a value residing outside the upper and lower quartile of the
distribution by more than twice the inter-quartile range. While the number of outliers is small they are
typically extreme and often resulted from a small number of observations in the original estimation sample.
We removed them here mainly for the purposes of illustration, while they do not significantly affect our
conclusions.
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Figure 3: Estimated increase in rail-transport due to BRI versus time-sensitivity, by HS2
sector
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(b) (log) rail over air
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(c) (log) rail over air+sea
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(d) (log) rail over non-rail
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(e) (log) rail share
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(f) rail share (PPML)
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
E
s
ti
m
a
te
d
 i
n
c
re
a
s
e
 o
f 
ra
il−
fr
e
ig
h
t 
to
 C
h
in
a
0 .02 .04 .06 .08
HS2−level measure of time−sensitivity (Hummels & Schaur 2013)
Note: Figures depict estimated responses of exports from Europe to China via rail-freight (using differ-
ent measures, see subtitles) and their relationship with a sectoral measure of time-sensitivity according to
Hummels and Schaur (2013). All estimates, except the one displayed in panel (f), are based on a log-linear
specification displayed in Eq. (4).
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Table 6: Export revenues and diversification revisited
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method Least Squares (log-linear) PPML
β̂k-specification (s)
Rail
over
Sea
Rail
over
Air
Rail
over
Air+Sea
Rail
over
Non-rail
Rail
over
Total
Rail
over
Total
Panel A: Dependent variable: export revenues
trainprox.it × β̃k,s 0.270∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.295∗∗ 0.303∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.195∗
(0.069) (0.071) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.087)
Implied change (%) +4.8 +4.4 +5.0 +5.7 +6.0 +4.2
Panel B: Dependent variable: Number HS6 products shipped
trainprox.it × β̃k,s 0.222∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.232∗∗ 0.248∗∗ 0.253∗∗ -0.027a
(0.033) (0.030) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.016)
Implied change (%) +4.0 +2.6 +4.0 +4.7 +4.9 -0.6
# HS2 (β̃k,s > 0) 28 23 27 29 31 37
Average (β̃k,s) 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.2 0.22
Observations 46,403 46,403 46,403 46,403 46,403 55,751
Clusters (it) 598 598 598 598 598 598
Note: Table shows log-linear regression and PPML coefficient estimates for value EU exports to China (Panel
A) and number of HS6 products shipped (Panel B), conditional of direct or indirect rail connection (via
proximate countries) and sectors’ relative probability to use rail-freight (i.e., β̃k,s, estimated as indicated
in column title). All specifications include HS2 sector-year and HS2 sector-exporter, and exporter-year
fixed effects, as well as aggregate HS2-level exports to the rest of the world (and overall diversification by
sector, in Panel B). Standard errors in parentheses adjusted for clustering at exporter-year level. Statistical
significance: a = p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers displayed below coefficients and standard errors
indicate implied percentage change in exports. Numbers displayed in the first two rows at the bottom of the
table indicate number (i) of HS2 sectors that were estimated to increase utilization of rail-freight, and (ii)
average β̃ observed in estimation sample.
As previously, log-linear specifications seem to produce somewhat larger coefficients.18 Nev-
ertheless, we find that the implied percentage change in export revenues is fairly similar,
ranging from 4.2-6.0 percent, depending on the specification.19 While this is less than the
estimated 11 percent increase in revenues we obtained earlier in Table 3 column (6), we
conclude that BRI railway connections are likely to have increased EU export revenues in a
range of different sectors. In Panel B, we report our corresponding results for export diver-
sification and find again that the number of goods exported to China increased in particular
sectors and relative to non-connected countries by about 4 percent on average.
18We use log-linear specifications here to remain consistent with the method from which we obtained our
estimates of β̂k,s
19We obtain implied changes by multiplying the estimated coefficient with the average value of β̃k,s in our
sample, and multiplying with 100 to obtain percentage units.
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Our PPML estimate in columns (6) reports a quantitatively small negative coefficient,
which is marginally significant. While this may cast some doubts about the robustness our
results, we note that this sample also encompasses the largest number of sectors that are
considered to shift towards rail transport. Over-estimating the number of responsive sectors
here might explain weaker estimated responses in diversification, due to measurement error.
5 Conclusion
Our paper studies patterns in merchandise trade data of European countries exporting to
China, conditional on the existence of new transport routes via the BRI railway Corridor. We
exploit detailed information on the starting date and number of such connections and leverage
their variation across countries and over time to analyze changes in the value of shipments and
the range of different products exported. Using alternative measures, estimation methods
and model specifications, we find strong support for a positive relationship between BRI
connections and export performance, which suggest that the new railway connections have
contributed to lower trade barriers and improved market access opportunities.
Our baseline results suggest an about 10 percent increase in export revenues, which are
realized not only by directly connected countries, but also by other proximately-located
European exporters, while being distinct from Europe-wide changes in export activity with
China. Using additional information on transport-mode choices, we further find that direct
BRI connections are positively correlated with increased utilization of rail-freight for exports
to China. Sectors (defined at the HS2 Chapter level) where rail-transport is estimated to
increase the most appear to (i) be of intermediate time-sensitivity and (ii) drive at least half
of the estimated increase in overall exports to China. While the former finding is in line
with theoretical considerations that rail-freight has intermediate time-saving potential when
compared to slow ocean cargo and very fast air-freight, the latter findings lend support to our
measurement and identification strategy which faces the limitation of not directly observing
a number of potential qualitative features of the individual BRI railway connections.
To this end, our study is the first to present empirical evidence on the efficiency of the
BRI and its potential benefits for European exporters. These benefits appear to materialize
in different dimensions, but are quantitatively still limited due to their only recent activation
in many cases. Nevertheless, we cannot reject trade-creation effects through easier market
access and find that our estimates are very similar to findings obtained by Baniya et al. (2019)
from structural estimates. While their results are not directly comparable to ours (they focus
on trade among all countries connected via the BRI, except Europe), their preferred estimate
of a 4.2 percent increase corresponds to the lower bound reported in our findings. This might
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be plausible, given that trade effects of the BRI are determined also by other factors, such
as the type of goods traded or complementary trade agreements.
To conclude, more detailed information about the differential characteristics of the railway
connections (e.g. frequency, capacity utilization, etc.) will be useful for future analyses which
will be able to exploit also additional years of data. With additional information at hand,
it might also be possible to test through which of the different theoretical channels, the BRI
connections affect trade activity, as they may operate through changes in travelled distances,
transit times, and transportation cost.
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Appendix
A Additional material
Table A1: Chinese BRI investment projects since October 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Region # countries
involved
# BRI
projects
share of all
Chinese
projects
in region
share of
total
Chinese
inv. volume
in region
share of
total
Chin. BRI
inv. volume
East Asia 16 363 0.99 0.99 0.29
Sub-Saharan Africa 31 314 0.93 0.94 0.24
West Asia 16 259 0.85 0.91 0.21
Middle East + N. Africa 13 194 1.00 1.00 0.09
Europe 22 127 0.34 0.22 0.11
Americas 12 76 0.48 0.49 0.04
Japan + South Korea 1 14 0.50 0.54 0.00
Australia + N. Zealand 1 8 0.06 0.05 0.00
Canada + United States 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 112 1,355 0.63 0.69 1.00
Note: Authors’ calculations based on monthly CGIT data, spanning the period from October 2013 through
December 2019. The original data set reports a total of 2,137 investment projects during this period. Column
(1) displays the number of countries in a region that receive Chinese BRI-related investment, while column
(2) counts the number of transaction in a region. Column (3) indicates how large then number of BRI
projects is compared to the total number of Chinese investment projects in the region. Column (4) shows
the same ratio, but for respective transaction volumes, measured originally in million USD. Column (5)
divides a region’s total BRI investment volume by China’s global BRI-related foreign investment.
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Table A2: Summary of cargo railway connections between China and the EU
Name of
connection
Start/End
China
Start/End
Europe
Operating
since
Distance
(km)
Duration
(days)
Duration
sea
(days)
YuXinOu Chongqing Duisburg, DEU 01-2011 11,179 14 35
Malaszewice, POL 01-2011 10,000 11 40
Mannheim, DEU 11-2018 11,200 17 35
SuManOu Suzhou Warsaw, POL 11-2012 11,200 15
RongXinOu Chengdu Lodz, POL 04-2013 9,826 11 27
Nuremberg, DEU 10-2015 10,500 13 40
Tilburg, NED 10-2016 10,947 15 45
Prague, CZE 10-2017 10,200 13 35
Milan, ITA 11-2017 11,694 14
Rotterdam, NED 10-2017 11,100 15
Vienna, AUT 04-2018 9,800 13 40
Luxembourg, BLX 04-2019 10,000 14
Budapest, HUN 08-2019 15
ZhengOu Zhengzhou Hamburg, DEU 07-2013 10,214 15
Duisburg, DEU 07-2013 10,400 15
Warsaw, POL 07-2013 9,400 13
Munich, DEU 08-2017 15
Zaragoza, ESP 12-2017 26 55
Liege, BLX 10-2018 10,650 15
HanXinOu Wuhan Duisburg, DEU 04-2014 10,863 16
Malaszewice, POL 04-2014 9,600 13
Hamburg, DEU 04-2014 10,650 16
Lyon, FRA 04-2016 11,300 16 55
Amsterdam, NED 05-2019 11,000 15
XiangOu Changsha Duisburg, DEU 10-2014 11,803 15
Warsaw, POL 10-2014 10,700 13
Budapest, FRA 06-2017 10,118 15
Hamburg, DEU 11-2017 11,500 15
Tilburg, NED 08-2018 12,912 15
YiXinOu Yiwu Madrid, ESP 11-2014 13,052 21
Malaszewice, POL 11-2014 10,000 11
Duisburg, DEU 11-2014 11,200 13
Riga, LVA 10-2016 11,066 15
London, GBR 01-2017 12,000 18
Prague, CZE 09-2017 10,500 16
Amsterdam, NED 03-2018 11,500 16
Zaragoza, ESP 11-2018 12,300 19
HeXinOu Hefei Hamburg, DEU 06-2015 10,600 15
Malaszewice, POL 06-2015 9,550 13
Vuosaari, FIN 12-2018 16
HaOu Harbin Hamburg, DEU 06-2015 9,820 16
Malaszewice, POL 06-2015 8,320 14
Changanhoa Xian Duisburg, DEU 10-2016 9,700 16
Hamburg, DEU 10-2016 9,400 16
Kouvala, FIN 11-2017 8,000 12
Budapest, HUN 04-2017 9,300 17 47
Riga, LVA 11-2018 11,066 12
Prague, CZE 03-2019 9,623 11
Mannheim, DEU 05-2019 15
Milan, ITA 07-2019 18
Verona, ITA 08-2019 15
Bratislava, SKA 10-2019 12
Gdansk, POL 11-2019 9,000 12
- Dalian Bratislava, SKA 10-2017 10,537 15
- Urumqi Riga, LVA 10-2017 18
- Xiamen Budapest, HUN 01-2018 11,595 18
- Ganzhou Warsaw, POL 08-2017 18
Hamburg, DEU 09-2017 19
Duisburg, DEU 09-2017 13,000 19
Milan, ITA 09-2017 21
- Yingtan Antwerp, BLX 05-2018 11,000 16
Note: Authors’ compilation based on information from Li et al. (2018) and additional online searches (in-
cluding www.railfreight.com and www.chinaeuroperailwayexpress.com).
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